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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
KNIGHT REALTY INV. CO. , a 
Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
CHARLES C . MOORE AND 
CHARLES C. MOORE d/b/a 
SOUTH VILLAGE SHOPPING 
CENTER AND SOUTH VILLAGE 
SHOPPING CENTER AND SOUTH 
VILLAGE, INC., a Utah 
Corporation, 
Defendant-Appellants. 
No. 16550 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff-Respondent, Knight Realty, Inv. Co., herein-
after termed Plaintiff, filed an action in the District Court of 
the Third Judicial District to enforce a contract for the payment 
of a real estate commission based upon a lease of property owned 
by Defendant-Appellant, South Village, Inc., hereinafter termed 
Defendant. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
1. The above-entitled matter was tried on April 18, 
1979 before the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr., a post-trial 
memorandum was filed by the Plaintiff pursuant to the Court's 
request for memoranda and after due consideration, the District 
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Court entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a 
Judgment in favor of the Plaintiff 
in the amount of Eighteen Thousand 
thereon. (R. 55-63.) 
and against the Defendant 
Dollars ($18, 000) with intere1~ 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant, South Village, Inc., seeks a reversal of 
the judgment of the District Court and an award of Appellant's 
costs on appeal. Respondent seeks affirmance of the judgment 
of the District Court and an award of Respondent's costs on 
appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant's Designation of Record on Appeal (R.66) 
specified that a transcript including all exhibits offered and 
received should be included in the record on appeal. After 
Appellant's brief had been filed and during the preparation of 
Respondent's brief, counsel for Respondent discovered that a tr~ 
script of the trial was not part of the record on file with the I 
Court. On January 2, 1980, Counsel for Respondent called the [ 
reporter, Robert Lewis, concerning the transcript and he stated,! 
after checking his records, that the transcript of the trial of i 
this matter had not been ordered by Appellant. 
-2-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
It is well settled that where the Appellant fails to 
file a transcript on appeal, the finings of fact of the trial 
court are presumed to be supported by substantial evidence, and 
the trial court's conclusions of law will not be overturned on 
appeal if supported by the findings of fact. Burton v. Garner, 
374 P.2d 707 (Colo. 1962); Henry v. Latta, 472 P.2d 694 (Colo. 
App. 1970); Shedd v. Adamson, 535 P.2d 799 (Nev. 1975); Reliance 
Ins. Co. v. Marchiondo, 91 N.M. 276, 573 P.2d 210 (1978); Huckaby 
v. Newell, 519 P.2d 1290 (Ore. App. 1974). 
For example, in Burton v. Garner, 374 P.2d 707 (Colo. 
1962), the appellant asserted that the findings of fact and judg-
ment were contrary to the pleadings and the evidence, yet the 
appellant failed to file the record on appeal. The court ruled 
as follows: 
There being no transcript before us 
we cannot consider this ground of asserted 
error. In its absence we are bound to 
presume that the findings and conclusions 
of the trial court are correct and that 
the evidence oresented supports the judgment. 
374 P.2d at 709. 
In Reliance Ins. Co. v. Marchiondo, 91 N.M. 276, 573 
P.2d 210 (1978) the court stated: 
The issue is whether under the state 
of this record we can justify overturning 
conclusions of law made by the trial court 
that appear on their face to be properly 
supported by the trial court's findings 
of fact. We think not. 
-3-
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The responsibility for seeing that 
a proper record is filed for an appeal to 
this Court is clearly that of the appellant. 
Basic to the right of appeal is the 
perfection, certification and filing of 
the record by the person who intends to 
rely upon it to support his assertions 
in the appellate court. [Citations omitted). 
The record before us is blank as to whether 
evidence was adduced in the trial court on 
the issues here involved orwhether there 
were material rulings made by the judge. 
We are confronted by the bare fact that no 
transcript of either evidence or proceedings 
is before us. 
Having neglected to provide a proper 
record on appeal, Reliance cannot challenge 
here the correctness of the decision of the 
trial court. [Citations omitted). 
Conclusions of law properly supported by 
findings of fact will not be overturned on 
appeal unless it is shown that the facts are 
not supported by substantial evidence. [Cita-
tions omitted]. Here Reliance has failed to 
provide a record from which such a showing 
could be made. 573 P.2d at 212-213. 
Thus, the Appellant has no basis to challenge the find·! 
ings of the trial court. Those findings must be deemed conclusi~ 
The facts as outlined in the Findings are as follows: 
1. On April 23, 1976 a Real Estate Listing Agreement, 
was executed by Keith Knight on behalf of the Plaintiff and 
by Charles Moore on behalf of the Defendant which provided that 
in consideration of the efforts of the Plaintiff to lease certair, 
-4-
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property owned by the Defendant to Prudential Federal Savings 
and Loan Association (hereinafter termed Prudential), Defendant 
would pay the Plaintiff a commission. (Exhibit 1-P; Findings of 
Fact, No. 1, R. 56.) 
2. On or about the 31st day of August, 1976, the 
Defendant executed a Lease Option Agreement whereby the 
Defendant offered to build certain improvements upon the 
property of the Defendant and to lease the same to Prudential. 
The property described was located south of the existing First 
Security Bank Building at approximately 9501 South 700 East 
in Salt Lake County. (Exhibit 2-P; Findings of Fact, No. 2, 
R. 56.) 
3. On or about the 25th day of February, 1977, the 
Defendant executed an Extension Agreement which extended the 
option set forth in Exhibit 1-P and in addition thereto the 
Defendant reserved the right to improve and lease alternate 
premises directly north of the existing First Security Bank 
premises. (Exhibit 3-P; Findings of Fact, No. 3, R. 52.) 
4. On or about the 15th day of August, 1977, the 
Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a further Real Estate 
-5-
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Commission Agreement which provided for the payment by the 
Defendant to the Plaintiff of a commission in the amount of 
$18,000. (Exhibit 5-P; Findings of Fact, No. 4, R. 56.) 
5. On or about August 15, 1977, the Defendant entered 
into an Agreement of Lease with Prudential. The lease described 
the property north of the First Security Bank building. At the 
time of execution of the lease by the Defendant, the Defendant 
endorsed thereon a statement to the effect that Defendant had not 
yet received all of the tenants' approvals and then stated "if we 1 
fail to receive their approval, the location south of the bank ( 
will be made available to PFS (Prudential), same size." /s/ Charle( 
C. Moore President. Mr. Moore also signed and noted the inclusion 1 
on the last page of the lease of a "subject to clause" awaiting 
approval of the tenants. (Exhibits 4-P and 6-P; Findings of Fact,/ 
No. 5, R. 56-57.) 
6. A meeting took place in the offices of Defendant 
on October 18, 1977. Present at the meeting were Mr. Moore and 
his son, Mr. Clawson, Mr. Charles Alcott of Prudential and Mr. 
Keith Knight. At that meeting, there was a discussion with respect\ 
to proceeding with the project. Mr. Moore advised the parties 
present that he was ready to proceed. Reference was made to the 
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limiting endorsement placed on the last page of the lease 
(Exhibit 6-P). A line was drawn through the limiting endorsement 
by Mr. Knight. A further endorsement was placed thereafter that 
reads "null and void, cancelled". Mr. Moore then signed this 
further endorsement, thereby eliminating the prior condition. 
Mr. Clawson was then authorized to proceed with the plans and 
specifications which he did. On that same date, October 18, 1977 
and at that meeting, Prudential delivered to l1r. Moore Prudential's 
letter dated October 14, indicating "that said lease agreement is 
now in full force and effect and binding upon the parties." (Exhi-
bit 9-P; Findings of Fact, No. 8, R. 57.) 
7. Mr. Moore acknowledged that he did not need the 
approval of Rexall to complete the improvements for Prudential 
on the location south of First Security's existing bank building. 
(Exhibit 10-P; Findings of Fact, No. 9, R. 57-58.) 
8. Prudential remained willing to accept either of 
the two locations. (Findings of Fact, No. 10, R. 58.) 
9. Neither Mr. Knight nor Prudential had any notice 
or knowledge of Defendant's contention that it required approval 
of the tenants for the north location until on or about August 15, 
1977 when Mr. Moore endorsed the limiting condition upon the 
lease. (Findings of Fact, No. 11, R. 58.) 
-7-
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10. Mr. Moore assured Mr. Knight that Rexall could 
not prevent the completion of the project since even with 
Prudential, the Defendant had the minimum amount of parking re-
quired by the Rexall lease. Mr. Moore presented to Mr. Knight 
his computations with respect to the required parking ratios. 
(Exhibit 16-P; Findings of Fact, No. 12, R. 58.) 
11. Arrangements were made for Prudential to provide 
the financing for the Defendant. The Defendant never made formal 
application therefor. Ultimately the Defendant failed, neglecte~,( 
declined and refused to proceed. Prudential then rescinded the ( 
lease because of Defendant's nonperformance. (Findings of Fact, 
No. 13, R. 58.) r 
12. The trial court found that the Plaintiff had two i 
reference into the first, and that the Plaintiff obtained at~ written commission agreements, the second incorporated by 
for the Defenant upon the terms and conditions acceptable to thel 
Defendant, all as set forth in the Lease 
which was executed by both the Defendant 
ings of Fact, No. 14, R. 58.) 
Agreement (Exhibit 6-P) I 
and Prudential. (Find·! 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
APPELLANT'S CONTENTIONS OF ERROR 
BY THE TRIAL COURT ARE NOT SUPPORTED 
BY THE RECORD ON APPEAL. 
I 
Appellant contends on appeal that the agreement for t~j 
payment of the commission to Plaintiff was conditioned upon the 
-8-
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completion or consummation of the lease and the obtaining of 
financing and that the failure of such conditions was caused 
not by the Defendant but by a third party. This contention of 
the Appellant is at variance with the findings of the Court and 
is not supported by the record on appeal. 
The lease, as originally executed, had a condition en-
dorsed thereon by the Appellant. At a later time, the Appellant 
eliminated the condition by its further endorsement. The lease 
was in fact consummated. Furthermore, the lessee remained willing 
to accept an alternate location which did not require any approval 
of a third party (Rexall). In addition, the lessee was ready, 
able and willing to provide the construction financing. There-
after, the Appellant simply refused to proceed with the construc-
tion of the improvements. Contrary to the unsubstantiated state-
ments in the Appellant's brief, the transaction failed not because 
of some third party impediment but because the Appellant refused 
to proceed after the Plaintiff had completely performed its service 
and had effected a lease of the property. 
Appellant concedes that the general rule is that a 
broker's commission is earned once the broker has procured a ready, 
willing and able buyer, or lessee, and that the commission cannot 
be defeated by the owner's subsequent refusal to complete the 
transaction. (Brief of Appellant pp. 4-5). In Curtis v. 
Mortensen, 267 P.2d 237 (Utah 1954), the Utah Supreme Court held 
-9-
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that the broker is entitled to a commission even though the sale 
was never consummated. 
The proposed purchasers were anxious to 
buy the property even after respondent's 
rescission of the earnest money agreement. 
Their suit for specific performance is 
ample proof of that fact. There can be 
no question about their willingness to buy 
and it was stipulated that they had the 
financial ability to consummate the sale. 
The sale was never consummated because the 
respondents changed their minds and refused 
to make a binding agreement. Under such 
circumstances appellants have fulfilled their 
part of the listing agreement by having 
produced purchasers who were ready, wil-
ling and able to buy the listed property 
and were entitled to their commission. 
267 P.2d at 239. 
This rule has been reiterated recently by the Utah 
Supreme Court in Davis v. Heath Development Co. , 558 P. 2d 594 
(Utah 1976). 
[I]f an agent so performs [i.e. obtain-
ing a ready, willing and able buyer], 
and the sale is not completed because of 
the lack of cooperation or obstruction 
by the listor . . . , the agent is never-
theless entitled to his commission. 
559 P.2d at 596. 
The Plaintiff in this case produced a ready, willing ( 
and able lessee as is evidenced by the execution by Prudential i 
I 
of a binding lease agreement. The fact that the lease was I 
not effectuated was not due to any failure on the part of 
the lessee but was in fact due to the Defendant's refusal to 
proceed. 
-10-
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POINT II 
THE APPELLANT' S OWN COUDUCT PREVENTED 
THE CONDITION mUCH IT NOW CLAIMS 
EXCUSES ITS PERFORMANCE. 
The Appellant corrently notes that the supplemental 
Real Estate Commission Agreement executed in August, 1977 provided 
for payment of the commission from the construction loan but then 
claims that since the construction didn't proceed, the condition 
wasn't met and that Appellant is thereby relieved from its acknow-
ledged obligation to pay the commission. 
It is clear that the provision was not intended to 
impose a condition precedent to the obligation of payment but 
merely prescribed a convenient manner or schedule for paying the 
commission which had already been earned. Assuming, however, that 
the construction was a condition precedent to the obligation to 
pay the commission, such condition was excused or waived because 
the Appellant actually prevented the construction. 
Appellant concedes that "no one can avail himself of 
the non-performance of a condition precedent who has himself 
occasioned its non-performance." Cannon v. Stevens School of 
Business, Inc., 560 P.2d 1383, 1385 (Utah 1977). (Brief of 
Appellant p. 7). 
The case of Hoyt v. Wasatch Homes, 261 P.2d 927 (Utah 
1953) is particularly relevant. In Hoyt, it was agreed that 
the broker's commission would be paid only if the sale were 
-11-
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consummated. The sale was not consummated, the earnest money 
agreement between the seller and the buyers having been mutually 
rescinded. The court held that the broker was entitled to his 
collllllission notwithstanding the fact that the condition of conSUIIi·[ 
mation was not satisfied. 
We are therefore impelled to the con-
clusion that the only reasonable inter-
pretation of the facts and circumstances 
shown is alternative (b): That the John-
sons had not failed in their obligations 
so as to subject them to forfeiture, and 
were ready, willing and able buyers. 
Under such circumstances, Hoyt could not 
by refusal to cooperate, defeat the 
Defendant's right to its commission. And 
we say this advisedly, notwithstanding 
the finding of the trial court, that when 
Hoyt originally engaged the Defendant to 
sell the property, it was agreed that the 
commission would be paid only if a sale 
were consummated. 
That agreement certainly contemplated 
that the Plaintiff would cooperate in 
good faith toward the accomplishment of 
the purpose for which he employed Defen-
dant. He cannot be permitted to procure 
them to obtain a buyer, on terms accepted 
by the Plaintiff, and then prevent the 
accomplishment of what he requested and 
authorized them to do by arbitrarily re-
fusing to perform his part of the trans-
action. Under such circumstances, he will 
not be heard to complain of their failure 
to do that which he prevented. 261 P.2d 
at 930. 
Appellant contends however, that the failure was not I 
caused by the Defendant but was in fact caused by Rexall' s refUS 
-12-
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to consent. (Brief of Appellant pp. 4-5). This position is 
untenable under the facts. Under the terms of the Extension 
Agreement (Exhibit P-3), the Defendant had the option to lease 
either of two locations to Prudential. Prudential remained willing 
to accept either of the two locations. The alternative location 
was not subject to the consent of prior tenants. Thus, it was 
the Defendant's own action that created the necessity of obtaining 
Rexall's consent. The Appellant could have avoided that problem 
by simply moving to the other location which was acceptable to 
Prudential and over which Rexall exercised no control. 
In any event, the Defendant's failure to obtain consent 
does not relieve it from the obligation to pay the commission. 
It has long been held that the seller's inability to transfer good 
title does not defeat the broker's right to a commission where the 
broker had no notice of the defect in title. See, ~. Little 
v. Fleishman, 101 P. 984 (Utah 1909); Stewart v. Lesin, 302 P.2d 
714 (Utah 1956). 
Neither the Plaintiff nor the lessees had any notice that 
the consent of Rexall might be necessary until August 15, 1977 when 
the Defendant added the consent condition to the lease agreement 
and even then the Defendant assured the Plaintiff that Rexall's 
consent would not be necessary. This consent condition was later 
nullified and cancelled by the Defendant and thus is of no effect. 
-13-
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I 
The cancellation of this condition left intact and unconditional'• 
the assertion on page one of the Agreement of Lease (Exhibit N: 
that the Defendant was the fee owner of and entitled to lease tl·. 
subject property. If the Defendant in fact was unable to lease! 
the property because of lack of consent or any other reason, sJ 
inability would not constitute a defense either to its obligati~l 
to lease the property or to its obligation to pay the Plaintif£'1  
commission. 
' 
,· 
The case of Bradley v. Westerfield, 402 P. 2d 577 (Ariz.~ 
I 
1965), is similar factually to the present case. In Bradley, l 
the broker was held to be entitled to a commission on the sale 
of a bar even though the sale fell through because the second 
mortgage holder refused to consent to the sale. The court helO 
as follows: 
The Defendant [vendor] knew, or should 
have known that there existed a restric-
tion on the transfer of the license in 
favor of the second chattel mortgagee. 
In order to deliver merchantable title, 
the duty to obtain his consent devolved 
upon her. Her inability or neglect to 
procure this consent did not relieve her 
from the obligation to pay to plaintiff 
the realty commission. 402 P.2d at 579-80. 
CONCLUSION 
There is no basis in the record on appeal upon which, 
Appellant can challenge the conclusion of the trial court that 1 
! 
-14-
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the Plaintiff fully performed its obligation of procuring 
a ready, willing and able lessee and thus earned the agreed 
commission of $18,000. The failure of the transaction subse-
quent to the execution of the lease was not due to any third 
party but was due solely to the Defendant's refusal to proceed. 
Therefore, the judgment of the trial court should be upheld. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ~ day of January, 1980. 
WATKISS & CAMPBELL 
Floor 
-15-
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT were served upon the Defendant and Appell~t 
South Village, Inc. by mailing the same, postage prepaid, to 
Thomas P. Vuyk, Esq., 425 South Fourth East, Suite 100, Salt L 
City, Utah 84111, this ~day of January, 1980. 
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